Chronicle of disinformation and manipulation in Armenia August–October 7, 2026

2026-10-08T15:10:34+02:008. October 2026|Tags: , |

Chronicle of disinformation and manipulation in Armenia August–October 7, 2026 How does a real state program turn into a promise to distribute money to everyone, a conference statement into a political accusation, and a real speech into a fabricated quote? Studies and educational materials published by the International Human Rights Community - Armenia organization since August provide an opportunity to follow these mechanisms. This chronicle compiles selected investigations and analyses

Armenien: Desinformation – Mittel der politischen Einflussnahme

2026-10-08T13:20:09+02:007. October 2026|Tags: , |

IGFM schult Medienschaffende bei der Abwehr von „Fakenews“ In kaum einem Land war Desinformation so verbreitet wie in Armenien vor den Parlamentswahlen am 7. Juni 2026. Nach der aserbaidschanischen Militäroffensive 2023, durch die mehr als 100.000 Armenier aus Berg-Karabach vertrieben wurden, war es die erste Wahl, bei der sich die seit 2018 regierende, europa-freundliche Partei des armenischen Premierministers Nikol Paschinjan den Wählern stellen musste. Russland versuchte, die Wahl durch gezielte

Deepfake: when you can’t even trust your own eyes

2026-10-07T15:44:39+02:007. October 2026|Tags: , |

"Deepfake: When you can't even trust your own eyes" Imagine a famous person making a statement in a video. You see his face, you hear his voice. Everything seems real. But he never said that. This is a deepfake: a video, sound, or image created or modified by artificial intelligence that can convincingly imitate the speech and appearance of a real person. And today, it is becoming increasingly difficult to

Do Russia’s 2026 election results show support for war?

2026-09-30T10:57:38+02:0027. September 2026|Tags: , |

Do Russia's 2026 election results show support for war? Claim: The victory of the pro-government United Russia party in the Russian State Duma elections and the high voter turnout show that citizens approved of the country's foreign policy and the war against Ukraine. Conclusion: Not confirmed. Official results show how many votes the electoral authorities attributed to parties and candidates. They do not reliably measure public attitudes toward the war.

MONITORING OF DISINFORMATION FLOWS Educational and practical manual for journalists, researchers and civil society representatives

2026-09-30T07:42:15+02:0024. September 2026|Tags: , |

The booklet was prepared within the framework of the "Monitoring Disinformation Flows" project by the Human Rights International (HRI) Armenia organization. The main goal of the project is to increase the level of media literacy, support journalists and young professionals in more effectively recognizing, analyzing, and countering disinformation flows in the modern information environment. MONITORING OF DISINFORMATION FLOWS Educational and practical manual for journalists, researchers and civil society representatives Monitoring

Lapshin reported that Armenian former prisoners refused to apply to the ECHR: what was actually said

2026-09-29T16:22:23+02:0023. September 2026|Tags: , |

The video, which was posted on the “Public News” Facebook page on September 20, has garnered more than 141,000 views and has been presented as a “scandalous revelation” by Alexander Lapshin. However, in the video, Lapshin’s actual statement is rewritten in a significantly different way; the most important difference is the case of Gevorg Sujyan. The day after the publication, on September 19, Sujyan announced that his application against Azerbaijan

Did Pashinyan really make such a statement about Kazakhstan?

2026-09-29T11:20:13+02:0021. September 2026|Tags: , |

In early September, a statement attributed to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spread on social media, which referred to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, relations between Armenia and Russia, and the topic of holding a referendum. According to the circulating publication, Pashinyan, referring to Russia’s alleged coercion of Armenia to hold a referendum, said: “I am not the president of Kazakhstan to be summoned to Russia. And we are not rich

From fake quotes to fake sources: A Russian network’s attempt to have its own Wikipedia for Armenia

2026-09-29T08:58:04+02:0017. September 2026|Tags: , |

From fake quotes to fake sources: A Russian network's attempt to have its own Wikipedia for Armenia In April 2026, just two months before the parliamentary elections in Armenia, the Russian organization Social Design Agency (SDA) developed a “clone” similar to Wikipedia, designed to automatically create new pages. But its goal was not only to reach readers. According to a Bloomberg investigation, the system was also designed to influence Google’s

Russian 102nd Military Base in Armenia: A Security Guarantee, Fact-Check Research, or a Non-Working Mechanism?

2026-09-27T19:59:15+02:0015. September 2026|Tags: , |

The presence of the Russian 102nd military base in Armenia has been presented for decades as a crucial component of Armenia's security system. At the same time, in recent years, opposing claims have been heard more frequently: that the base has not fulfilled its primary mission, is no longer useful to Armenia, and should be withdrawn. Russian 102nd Military Base in Armenia: A Security Guarantee, Fact-Check Research, or a Non-Working

Social networks as an accelerator of disinformation

2026-09-28T16:56:10+02:0015. September 2026|Tags: , |

Why does false information spread so quickly on social media? Social networks as an accelerator of disinformation One of the reasons is the algorithms of social networks. Platforms track what we watch, what we linger on, what we like, comment on, or share. If a piece of content gets a lot of traction, the algorithm can show it to more people. But here's an important thing: the algorithm doesn't decide

Go to Top