Parliamentary elections will be held in Moldova on Sunday 28 September 2025.

Like most of the previous elections in Moldova, these elections are geopolitical. The confrontation between the two camps of pro-European and pro-Russian has been going on for a year now, tearing the small country of two million people into two warring halves.

The previous presidential elections and the referendum for European integration in 2024 showed that the country is divided roughly equally in its preferences. Undoubtedly, a similar ratio will remain in the next parliamentary elections.

It is worth noting that the election campaign is taking place in a highly competitive environment with accusations of external interference.

 

How the election campaign was conducted

• The campaign took place amid heightened tension and heightened geopolitical competition.Authorities said there were attempts at hybrid interference by Russia. The Information and Security Service and police conducted hundreds of searches, detaining, according to media reports, 74 people suspected of preparing to destabilise Serbian camps elections under the direction of Russian intelligence services. The government and President Maia Sandu directly link the operations to external centres of influence.

• At the same time, there has been a surge in a high-tech information campaign – monitoring has detected waves of AI-created disinformation, fake websites and coordinated online operations targeting pro-European forces and in particular the PAS/president. This has been the subject of international publications and analyses.

• International observation bodies and experts note increased risks to electoral integrity: disputes over list registration, CEC warnings, court complaints and requests to verify financial sources for some blocs and parties. ODIHR/OSCE issued interim reports documenting legal disputes and procedural issues in registration and declaration. More than 30 organisations and 120 experts from 50 countries were refused by the CEC to participate as observers.

• Due to Moldova’s inability to ensure the security of polling stations in Transnistria, it was decided to reduce their number from 41 to 12. And 5 of them were moved to more secure areas inside the controlled territory. Also due to security problems in Russia, where several hundred thousand Moldovan citizens live, two polling stations will be opened.

 

Who are the main players and favourites

• The best chances of entering parliament, according to the latest major barometers, are:

  1.  The Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) is a ruling pro-European force led by incumbent President Maia Sandu

  2. The Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP) is a pro-Russian association that included PSRM and similarly orientated groups;

  3. The “Alternative” bloc headed by the incumbent mayor of the Moldovan capital Chisinau – Ion Ceban. The bloc declares its pro-European position.

  4. “Our Party” is a populist party led by a politician with a scandalous past, Renato Usatii.

• Important: in different polls, the proportion of “undecided/no response” remains significant; when recalculated based on those who have made up their minds, the positions of the blocs may look different. Also, polls often do not fully take into account the diaspora and the population of Transnistria (which may skew the overall picture) and hundreds of thousands of Moldovan citizens in Russia who are not allowed to vote.

What violations and problems are recorded by observers and the media

The CEC and courts have been considering dozens of complaints related to list registration and declaration of funding in recent weeks. Some parties received warnings of irregularities. International observers (OSCE/ODIHR) documented “multiple legal disputes” and emphasised the need for transparency.

Journalists and experts also point to the risks of vote-buying in a context of high inflation and poverty.

• Allegations of illegal financing and links to oligarchic networks. В A number of pro-Russian forces have been accused of undeclared funding, and agencies have initiated checks and preventive measures.

• Disinformation and technology attacks. Massive campaigns with AI content, media spoofing and coordinated promotion of fakes is one of the central problems of this campaign.

• Procedural disputes and administrative decisions. The CEC and courts addressed list registration issues and warned some blocs and candidates; international missions noted the multiplicity of complaints and high legal conflict potential.

• Risks of socio-economic background: high inflation, poverty, dissatisfaction with social conditions – fertile ground for practices of “infusion” of votes (bribery/social payments from players loyal to Moscow), as journalistic investigations and analyses have documented.

Predictions and odds of winning

According to various forecasts, none of the main electoral competitors alone will be able to win a majority.

Possible post-election scenarios

• Absolute majority PAS (unlikely): maintaining the course towards European integration and political stability.

• BEP Leadership: attempt to change the foreign policy course, increasing confrontation with the EU and the authorities.

• Coalition parliament (most likely scenario): complex negotiations, risk of shaky alliances and instability.

• Challenging the results: in case of a close result, mass complaints, protests and a new wave of information attacks are possible.

Options for post-vote developments (main scenarios)

1. PAS victory with an absolute majority (51+ mandates).
   Implications: maintaining course on rapprochement with the EU, cabinet stability, continued reforms. Unlikely by current measurements – PAS leads, but often fails to pick up >50% of seats. (If that happens – quick political “clean” mandate for reforms.)

2. BEP victory/leadership, majority pro-Russian and populist forces (bloc gets the largest caucus, but no clear majority).
   Consequences: attempts to revise the foreign policy vector, increased conflicts with the pro-European establishment, risk of sanctions/external pressure, high potential for street protests and political instability.

3. No party gets a majority – a coalition parliament.
   Consequences: lengthy negotiations, shaky coalition, risk of frequent reshuffles; vulnerability to corrupt deals and influence of external players. Many analysts consider this scenario to be the most realistic.

4. Challenging results and street polarisation.
   In the case of a close result, there may be mass complaints, attempts to challenge legitimacy (both on the part of the authorities and the opposition), as well as intensified information wars and diplomatic interference. There are already preconditions for such a development (accusations of interference, inspections and lawsuits).

PAS’s omissions over the years

1. Socio-economic sphere

• High inflation and falling living standards. Despite massive aid from the EU, food and utility prices have risen faster than wages. For many citizens, the pro-European course is associated with economic hardship rather than improved quality of life.

• Slow social reforms. PAS has promised tangible increases in pensions and benefits, but the actual changes are perceived as insufficient.

2. Fight against corruption

• Unfulfilled Expectations. In 2021, PAS came to power with a promise to “clean up the country”. There were loud statements and a few show cases, but citizens did not see a systemic breakthrough.

• Protracted judicial reforms. The purge of the judiciary has stalled: many key appointments have been postponed or blocked. This created a sense of “stagnation” and gave the opposition an argument that the government was failing.

3. Communication with society

• A disconnect from the population. The ruling party focused on European integration but rarely explained to people how it would affect their daily lives.

• Insufficient work in the regions. PAS remains strong in Chisinau, but its support is declining in the provinces and especially in the southern and northern districts, where pro-Russian parties are traditionally strong.

4. Managerial errors

• Personnel Policies. Ministers in the government changed frequently, giving the impression of instability and unprofessionalism.

• Weak response to crises. In the energy crisis of 2022-2023, the authorities managed to avoid collapse, but failed to convince the population that they were coping effectively.

5. Foreign policy emphasis without domestic “balance”

• A pro-European agenda without quick dividends. EU membership is perceived as a distant prospect and real difficulties are perceived as present.

• Ignoring the sentiments of a section of society. A significant part of the electorate – especially in rural areas and among the older generation – is Russia-oriented. PAS rarely sought dialogue with them.

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Why the chances of pro-Russian forces are increasing

1. Economic discontent. People are disappointed with rising prices and the weak effect of reforms. Pro-Russian parties promise “cheap gas”, “affordable food” and social benefits.

2. Nostalgia and cultural affinity. For a part of society, orientation towards Moscow is still more familiar than towards Brussels.

3. Мa massive disinformation campaign. Pro-Russian forces are actively using the media network and social media, including AI-fakes, which strengthens their position.

4. PAS error in mobilisation. In 2021, PAS got a record result due to the diaspora and the protest vote against the oligarchs. Today, these factors are no longer present, and apathy in society has grown.

5. The fragmentation of the pro-European camp. Apart from PAS, there are other liberal and centrist projects that are “pulling” votes, while pro-Russian forces have been able to unite into blocs (e.g. BEP).

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PAS remains a strong party with a stable pro-European core, but accumulated mistakes in socio-economic policy, shortcomings in the fight against corruption and poor communication with the public have led to the disappointment of part of the electorate. Against this background, the united pro-Russian forces have a chance to regain their positions and even claim leadership in parliament.

PAS did make progress in key areas – European integration, energy independence, support for the diaspora. But the successes were often accompanied by a social price: rising tariffs, weak effect of the anti-corruption campaign, insufficient social protection. It is these failures that opened a window of opportunity for the opposition and explain why, in 2025, pro-Russian forces still find support among a large part of the electorate.

Bottom line

The 28 September elections promise to be one of the most competitive in recent years. The final distribution of seats in parliament will depend not only on party ratings, but also on the mobilisation of undecideds, diaspora turnout and the authorities’ ability to ensure a transparent process.