Blankspot has obtained a Russian document entitled “2026 Programme of Work on Countering Fashism” from a reliable source.

 

The document outlines both the general objectives and the specific methods for carrying out the work.

The document states, among other things, states that the central aim is to present the elections as a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, personally. It also describes efforts to limit the influence of the incumbent government of Armenia ahead of the parliamentary elections on 7 June. Another objective is to prevent the transformation or ‘modernisation’ of Pashinyan’s ‘political image’ before the vote.

However, the document does not specify which opposition party Russia prefers over Pashinyan’s “Citizens’ Contract” party. Instead, it outlines the tools that should be used to influence public opinion.

Among the proposals is a plan to triple the presence of Russia-related stories on social media by autumn 2025, from one million to three million daily views. According to the document, the number of opinion leaders in the Russia-linked network should be expanded from 15 to around 40 individuals.

The document also states that the most prominent among them should be appointed to elected positions in opposition parties before the elections.

It also describes the so-called ‘false flag’ campaigns on social media, campaigns of targeted comments directed at the ruling party’s campaign staff and the creation of “stringer groups” dedicated to producing exclusive content during the election campaign.

At the beginning of the document, Russia’s objectives ahead of the Armenian elections are outlined. The full document can be read in both Russian and English.

Blankspot was able to verify the document’s authenticity and origin, but it is impossible to determine how far the strategy has actually been implemented or how significant it is for Russian influence efforts ahead of the elections. Several aspects of the document, however, correspond to the recent developments in Armenia.

During the document review, Blankspot determined that it originated from materials acquired after a third-party hacking attack was carried out against an individual operating within Russian intelligence services prior to March 2026. His activities in Armenia reflect the content of the document.

In Armenia, that person has participated in conferences and seminars, met with opposition politicians and frequently commented in the media on the country’s political development. The message has often been the same: that Armenia is heading down a dangerous path by moving away from Russia.

Ahead of the parliamentary elections, the debate over Russian influence in Armenia led to the Armenian government, already in December 2025, the Armenian government appealed to the EU for assistance to counter Russian influence – the same kind of support that was provided to Moldova during last year’s parliamentary elections.

According to EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the same networks that were previously active in Moldova are now also operating in Armenia.

Similar suspicions have also been directed at neighbouring Georgia, where no special EU support measures were offered during the 2024 elections.

In April, Meta shut down around 70 Facebook accounts and pages in Armenia that were deemed fake. At the same time, Russian officials have repeatedly accused Armenian civil society organisations of spreading “anti-Russian narratives.” Cyber security analysts have also pointed out that Russia is carrying out so-called phishing attacks against Armenia.

Stockholm Forum for the Free World Patrick Oxanen, a senior research fellow and expert on Russian influence operations at the Stockholm Free World Forum think tank, said that the content of the document closely matches the report of the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency.

It is clear from the document that Russian influence is not primarily about propaganda in the classical sense. It is about social engineering: sowing distrust, polarisation and resignation within society.

He went on to insist that the strategy was not new.

They not only try to influence people’s thinking but also their political responses, emotions and actions; in the Soviet era this became known as reflexive control. And it is carried out in a highly systematic, data-driven and organised manner, almost like modern advertising campaigns or psychological operations. The case of Armenia is yet another confirmation of this.”

Oksanen also warned that the traditional methods of countering Russian influence – by strengthening the West’s resilience through knowledge, fact-checking and enhanced cybersecurity – have not been entirely effective.

That in itself is good, but it is not enough. Since then, we have tried to reduce access and opportunities through sanctions against individuals and organisations, as well as by demanding that social media companies limit the dissemination and spread of information. That has also not deterred or changed Moscow’s willingness to attack us. We have now reached the point where the West must consider additional methods.”

A month before the elections, it is clear that the race will be between the incumbent government, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and the newly formed ‘Strong Armenia’ party of Russian-based Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. Public opinion polls show a clear advantage for the government.

The parliamentary elections in June will be the first since the snap elections held in the summer of 2021, which took place just a few months after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in the autumn of 2020.

Although the ‘Civil Contract’ party won the 2021 elections, Pashinyan’s popularity has declined since then. One of the key reasons is that more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh in the autumn of 2023, following an attack by Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, critics argue that some parts of the promised democratic reform agenda have not been implemented since the 2018 change of government, when Pashinyan came to power.

On 7 May, Pashinyan announced that he would not attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May, which were dedicated to the Second World War.