{"id":13077,"date":"2018-01-29T09:10:24","date_gmt":"2018-01-29T08:10:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/?p=13077"},"modified":"2021-11-26T10:47:58","modified_gmt":"2021-11-26T09:47:58","slug":"die-moldauischen-behoerden-haben-den-prozess-der-demokratisierung-abgebrochen-und-ihre-verpflichtungen-gegenueber-der-eu-nicht-erfuellt","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/de\/die-moldauischen-behoerden-haben-den-prozess-der-demokratisierung-abgebrochen-und-ihre-verpflichtungen-gegenueber-der-eu-nicht-erfuellt\/","title":{"rendered":"Die moldauischen Beh\u00f6rden haben den Prozess der Demokratisierung abgebrochen und ihre Verpflichtungen gegen\u00fcber der EU nicht erf\u00fcllt"},"content":{"rendered":"

Die moldauischen Beh\u00f6rden haben den Prozess der Demokratisierung abgebrochen und ihre Verpflichtungen gegen\u00fcber der EU nicht erf\u00fcllt<\/h1>\n

<\/a>1. Introduction<\/h3>\n
\n

The tendency to violate democratic standards and the rule of law in Moldova continues. In the interests of pro-government forces, new electoral law was adopted. The authorities began to tighten the control over the activities of non-governmental organisations. The law enforcement and judicial systems are used to prosecute oppositionists and civil society activists who oppose the usurpation of power in the country.<\/p>\n

According to the conclusions of Transparency International, in Moldova, a narrow oligarchic group continues the process of \u2018capturing\u2019 the state with the use of public institutions and resources in their own mercenary interests. Particularly successful in this field is the most influential Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc.<\/p>\n

In recent years, Plahotniuc, who does not occupy a high public office, managed to take control<\/a> of the parliament, the executive branch of power, as well as the law enforcement, anti-corruption, and, to a large extent, the judiciary bodies. He owns 60-70% of the TV market<\/a> in Moldova<\/a>. Plahotniuc’s assets are estimated at 2-2.5 billion dollars<\/a>, which is about 30%<\/a> of the country’s GDP.<\/p>\n

Recent events testify to the formation in Moldova of an informal ruling coalition of the forces of President Igor Dodon and oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc. Pro-Russian Dodon has a high level of support from the society (approx. 50%<\/a>); however, he does not have real power in the state. Vladimir Plahotniuc, whose political force declares its pro-European orientation, on the contrary, is the most influential figure in Moldova, but, at the same time, extremely unpopular. Plahotniuc plays on the contradictions between the EU and Russia, using the rhetoric that he is the \u2018only pro-European alternative<\/a>\u2019. At the same time, the company that belongs to him in 85%<\/a>, is the station retransmitting one of the main mouthpieces of Russian propaganda – Channel One<\/a>, in Moldova.<\/p>\n

The existence of the tandem of Dodon-Plahotniuc, illogical at the first glance, can be explained by the desire of both to remain in power and, at the same time, to effectively prevent changes in the country. The current Moldovan authorities are interested in preserving the existing corruption system, which allows them to enrich themselves at the expense of the State and citizens. Due to the puppet law enforcement agencies, they can feel safe and eliminate their competitors and critics.<\/p>\n

Reforms, in which international partners had placed their hopes (in particular, in the justice system<\/a>), transpired to be merely an imitation of activity and did not change the rules of the game in the state.<\/p>\n

In order to stabilise the economic situation in the country, the Moldovan authorities need assistance from the EU. In this report, the Open Dialog Foundation cites facts which confirm Moldova\u2019s failure to fulfill its commitments, assumed in connection with the EU\u2019s decision to provide macro-financial assistance and conclude the Association Agreement with the EU. The report considers the following problems: changing of the electoral system; initiatives to restrict foreign funding for NGOs; politically motivated criminal prosecutions; torture in the detention facilities; cases of exerting pressure on journalists and representatives of the civil society.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>2. The Democratic Party\u2019s attempt to maintain power by changing the election system<\/h3>\n
\n

In the previous parliamentary elections, the Democratic Party of Moldova, headed by Plahotniuc, got less than 16% of the vote. However, the alliance with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Liberal-Reform Party allowed the Plahotniuc party to form a ruling coalition in the parliament<\/strong>. During its governance, the Democratic Party’s ranking dropped to a critical level. According to recent sociological research (October 2017), in the case of parliamentary elections, this party would gain approx. 8% of the votes cast<\/a> (with the electoral threshold of 6%).<\/p>\n

In the autumn of 2018, the next parliamentary elections should take place in Moldova. In March 2017, representatives of the Democratic Party initiated changes to the electoral law<\/strong>, proposing to move from elections system based on the party lists to the majority election system.<\/p>\n

This initiative caused a wave of outrage among the Moldovan community. On 5 May 2017, the Moldovan parliament approved, in the first reading, the draft law of the formally oppositional Socialist Party, whose member, until recently, was President Igor Dodon. The party proposed an alternative to the reform of the electoral system, namely, the transition to a mixed electoral system (half of the members of the parliament to be elected by the party lists, while the other half – in single-member majority constituencies).<\/p>\n

According to the findings of Transparency International experts<\/a>, the 70% of the draft law proposed by the Socialist Party is similar in structure and content to the draft law of the Democratic Party. The only important difference is the proposal to introduce the mixed system, rather than the majority system. The draft law of the Socialist Party was put to the vote of the parliament without preliminary examination by the government and parliamentary commissions, and without carrying out anti-corruption expertise.<\/p>\n

On 20 July 2017, the Moldovan parliament approved by \u00be of the votes cast on a change to the mixed electoral system by supporting the entire draft law of the Socialist Party. The vote has confirmed the existence in the parliament, of a situational alliance of political forces of Vladimir Plahotniuc and Igor Dodon.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The new legislation on the elections was adopted despite the negative opinion<\/a> of the Venice Commission (published on 19 June 2017)<\/strong>, which noted the lack of political consensus in Moldova as to which electoral system is needed in the country. In particular, the national debate was not properly conducted. The conclusions of the Venice Commission emphasise that, in modern Moldova, there is a risk that the MPs, elected on the basis of the majority electoral system, will be dependent or under the influence of big business. In addition, experts drew attention to the fact that, under the new law, the Central Election Commission (CEC) is responsible for forming the boundaries of single-member constituencies. However, the criteria for the formation of constituencies are not clearly defined, which creates the risks of the exertion of political influence on the CEC.<\/p>\n

The mixed electoral system increases the chances of pro-government political forces <\/strong>in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. In majority constituencies, pro-government candidates will be able to misuse administrative resources. And, on the other hand, the chances of the opposition forces to get a significant number of parliamentary seats are significantly reduced.<\/p>\n

The change in the electoral law in the context of a decline in the electoral ranking, is a common method of exerting artificial influence on the election results. The situation, identical to that in Moldova, took place in Ukraine in the run-up to the 2012 parliamentary elections. <\/strong>Sociological surveys recorded a decline in the rankings of the pro-government \u2018Party of Regions\u2019. On the initiative of the authorities, a year before the parliamentary elections in the country, the election law was amended. Ukraine moved from elections based on the party lists to the mixed system. As a result, the Party of Regions<\/a> won by 4% less of the votes cast than in the previous parliamentary election of 2007 (30% vs. 34% in 2007), but it managed to increase its representation<\/a> in parliament by almost 6%. It was possible for the Party of Regions to achieve a positive result for themselves due to the fact that the party won in more than half of single-member constituencies. On the other side, the opposition parties that won almost 50% of the votes cast in the election, lost the election in majority constituencies and received only 40% of the seats in the parliament, which, consequently, prevented them from forming a ruling coalition.<\/p>\n

The current Moldovan authorities replaced the election law just one year before the elections, which may indicate that they are making attempts to change the system for their own benefit.<\/p>\n

High Representative of the EU Federica Mogherini and CommissionerJohannes Hahn stressed that the change in the electoral law in Moldova \u2018directly contradicts<\/a>\u2019 the recommendations of the Venice Commission.\u00a0The US Embassy in Moldova stated its disappointment<\/a> in connection with the fact that Moldova ignores the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the OSCE by Moldova.\u00a0The European People’s Party labelled the decision on changing the electoral system in Moldova \u2018the preference for authoritarism over democracy<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

The European People’s Party and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe appealed to European institutions with a call to respond to the decline in the level of the rule of law and democratic standards in Moldova, as well as to suspend any financial assistance for Moldova, and revise<\/a> the Association Agreement.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>3. Narrowing the space for free media, NGOs and civil activists<\/h3>\n
\n

According to the ranking of the World Press Freedom Index, produced by the organisation \u2018Reporters Without Borders\u2019, in 2017, Moldova ranks 80th among 180 countries and, compared to 2016, it went down<\/a> four points.\u00a0The organisation noted that the editorial policy of the main Moldovan media is closely related to the political and business interests of their owners. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit<\/a>, in 2016, Moldova ranked 76th globally in terms of democracy, which is six points lower than in 2015. The downgrade was mainly due to the decline in the civil liberties index in the country (from 8.5 to 7.35 points on the 10-point scale).<\/p>\n

Moldova continues to exert pressure on journalists and representatives of the civil society.<\/p>\n

On 10 July 2017, a joint meeting of the leadership of the Moldovan prosecutor’s office with representatives of Amnesty International was held. At the meeting, Deputy General Prosecutor Igor Popa expressed his dissatisfaction with the findings of the organisation which recorded a number of violations at the court trial of Petrenco. In response, Amnesty International issued a statement, accusing the General Prosecutor of an attempt to intimidate and discredit the organisation. \u201cWe consider unacceptable the manner the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office organised an event by planning \u201ca public execution\u201d, and namely presenting an agenda about strengthening the cooperation between the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office and Amnesty International Moldova<\/a>. (\u2026) It is not in the competence of the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office to initiate discussions and to question AI annual reports, press-releases or other documents, all related on human rights and freedoms in the Republic of Moldova\u201d<\/em>,\u00a0\u2013 the organisation stated.<\/p>\n

On 29 September 2017, it became known that journalist Ghenadie Brega <\/strong><\/a>applied for political asylum in Iceland. Brega stated that he had faced politically motivated criminal prosecution. The Moldovan police put Brega on the wanted list for evading prosecution, although, according to his counsel, law enforcement agencies were aware of his whereabouts. Brega was accused of hooliganism: in January 2017, he allegedly used \u2018aggression and physical violence\u2019 against the official of the Central District of Chisinau, Vasile Uratu. Brega claims that he had to defend himself, as he was first attacked by the official when he was striving to document the violation of the law on the part of the latter.<\/p>\n

On 18 October 2017, the Centre for Independent Journalism published an official appeal<\/a> on behalf of 15 NGOs to the embassies of foreign countries in Moldova. The appeal notes an increase in incidents of obstruction of journalistic activities and exerting pressure on journalists in Moldova<\/strong>. Examples of the ill-treatment included: detention by the police of the film crew of Gagauz.info in March 2017; surveillance of the editor of the Newsmaker.md portal, Vladimir Solovyov; selective restriction of access to places of public interest for the film crews of the TV channel \u2018TV8\u2019 and photojournalist Constantin\u00a0Grigori\u0163\u0103. In October 2017, security guards of the Global Business Center, owned by Vladimir Plahotniuc, threatened journalists of the newspaper \u2018Ziarul de Garda\u2019 and did not allow them to take video footage in the business centre.<\/p>\n

On 2 November 2017, the information agency OMEGA<\/strong><\/a> reported that the number of lawsuits against the agency for protection of honour and business reputation has raised. As reported in the statement, the claims were filed by public persons following the release of materials, critical of them. One of the claims was granted by the court in the absence of representatives of the agency. \u201cThe orchestrated harassment of the OMEGA agency is a response of the state to a certain critical position of the agency regarding the activities of the authorities\u201d<\/em>, the statement reads.<\/p>\n

The ban on external financing for non-profit organisations<\/strong><\/p>\n

Following the criticism on the part of representatives of the Moldovan civil society regarding the changes in the electoral law, the authorities of the country put forward an initiative to limit the financing of NGOs from abroad. Minister of Justice Vladimir Chebotar enunciated that the restrictions would \u2018prevent the influence of external forces\u2019 on the policy of Moldova.<\/p>\n

The Ministry of Justice proposed several amendments to the draft law on non-profit organisations. The changes<\/a> concern the organisations which take part in political and lawmaking processes. According to the proposed amendments, such organisations will not be able to receive \u2018financing or material values from outside the Republic of Moldova\u2019. It is also proposed to oblige non-profit organisations which receive funding from foreign sources, to file reports not only to the tax service, but also to the Ministry of Justice. They will also be required to report their incomes and expenditures in the field of \u2018political activity\u2019 to the Ministry of Justice and the Central Election Commission.<\/p>\n

Thus, the proposed amendments will not only limit the possibility of financing NGOs from outside Moldova, but will also tighten control over them by the state structures<\/strong>. Such practices exist solely in authoritarian states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan). A very vague treatment of \u2018political activity\u2019 in the draft law creates a threat of its selective use in order to prosecute NGOs which are inconvenient to the authorities.<\/p>\n

For violation of the law, NGOs will be fined and may even be deprived of a license by court order.<\/p>\n

More than 70 Moldovan NGOs opposed the initiative of the Ministry of Justice. Representatives of the civil society stated that at least 90% of NGOs receive foreign funding<\/a>, and, should the amendments be introduced, they simply will not be able to work.<\/p>\n

On 11 September 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zayed Ra’ad al-Hussein, expressed<\/a> his concern over the attempts of the Moldovan authorities to restrict the activities of NGOs. The Commissioner stressed that legislative changes should lead to the expansion of opportunities for a free and independent civil society.\u00a0Freedom House<\/a> stated that, should the amendments proposed by the Ministry of Justice be adopted, all the achievements on the path of democratisation of the country over the past decade will be obliterated\u201d. Amnesty International<\/a> stressed that the right to freedom of association in Moldova is at serious risk, and urged the authorities to immediately withdraw the amendments to the law.<\/p>\n

President Igor Dodon supported<\/a> the idea of limiting foreign funding for NGOs. This is the second time<\/strong> (along with the amendment of the electoral law), when the president and the ruling coalition jointly promote an initiative, criticised by Western partners and the Moldovan community for its undemocratic nature.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>4. Politically motivated criminal prosecution in Moldova<\/h3>\n
\n

On 11 September 2017, during the opening of the 36th session of the Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner Zeyd Ra’ad al-Hussein<\/a> expressed his concern over reports of harassment and persecution of counsels who defend representatives of the opposition, as well as human rights defenders and journalists in Moldova.<\/p>\n

Criminal prosecution based on dubious criminal charges is a popular method of combating political opponents and critics in Moldova. In its previous report<\/a>, the Open Dialog Foundation cited examples of criminal cases, which are accompanied by procedural violations and bear signs of political motivation:<\/p>\n