{"id":77628,"date":"2026-08-25T11:19:17","date_gmt":"2026-08-25T09:19:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/?p=77628"},"modified":"2026-08-30T11:23:24","modified_gmt":"2026-08-30T09:23:24","slug":"from-deepfakes-to-fear-mongering-what-types-of-disinformation-are-european-countries-facing-during-elections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/from-deepfakes-to-fear-mongering-what-types-of-disinformation-are-european-countries-facing-during-elections\/","title":{"rendered":"From deepfakes to fear-mongering: What types of disinformation are European countries facing during elections?"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>From deepfakes to fear-mongering: What types of disinformation are European countries facing during elections?<\/h1>\n<p><span dir=\"auto\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignleft  wp-image-77629\" src=\"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_.jpg\" alt=\"News\" width=\"449\" height=\"254\" srcset=\"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-31x18.jpg 31w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-200x113.jpg 200w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-354x200.jpg 354w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-400x226.jpg 400w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-600x339.jpg 600w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-768x434.jpg 768w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_-800x452.jpg 800w, https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/news_.jpg 840w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 449px) 100vw, 449px\" \/>Electoral processes in Europe are increasingly turning not only into political competition, but also into large-scale information warfare. Social media algorithms, \u201cdormant\u201d user accounts, artificial intelligence, and the fears accumulated in society allow even a single real incident to turn into a political crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span dir=\"auto\">During a seminar held in Yerevan, experts from the Polish organization &#8220;praktycy.eu&#8221; told Armenian journalists about the types of disinformation encountered in European countries, especially during elections, and their experience in combating them. According to media expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Jaros\u0142aw Sli\u017cewski<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , &#8220;each of us lives in our own Internet,&#8221; where falsehood is often more attractive than the truth, as it satisfies people&#8217;s emotional needs. Sli\u017cewski, Polish expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Pawel Nowacki<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , Romanian expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Rezvan Petri<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> and other specialists identify 5 main mechanisms of influence used in European elections.<\/span><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Fake programs and &#8220;black PR&#8221;<\/span><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Germany:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> A coordinated campaign was carried out against the Green Party during the parliamentary elections. More than 270 car exhaust pipes were filled with construction foam and \u201cBe Greener\u201d stickers were pasted on them to direct drivers\u2019 anger at the party. At the same time, fake documents were distributed claiming that the Greens were planning to ban private cars in shifts.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Slovakia:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Presidential candidate Ivan Kor\u010dok was falsely accused of planning to send Slovak soldiers to Ukraine (although the president has no such authority). Young voters were also offered free trips to Brussels to get them out of the country on election day, in an attempt to keep them away from the vote.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Technological manipulations and deepfakes<\/span><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Germany:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> A deepfake video of a woman destroying Alternative for Germany (AfD) ballot papers was widely circulated. In addition, Russian networks created fake websites imitating Der Spiegel and Die Welt with articles about Germany\u2019s economic \u201cfailures.\u201d<\/span><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">The hotel page, which was not available for booking due to technical difficulties on Cyprus.com<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , was presented as \u201cproof\u201d that it had been purchased by Volodymyr Zelensky.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">The AI \u200b\u200bchallenge:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Jaroslav Slizhevsky<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> notes that due to the development of artificial intelligence, detecting fakes has become dramatically more difficult: if previously AI-generated images were easy to recognize with obvious errors (for example, six-fingered hands), now such signs have almost disappeared, and there is no single clear sign to spot a fake.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Manipulation of real facts<\/span><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Poland:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> In September 2025, in the hours after 21 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, dormant accounts and anti-vaccination pages left over from the COVID-19 era activated the hashtag #tonienaszawojna (\u201cthis is not our war\u201d). According to <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Pawe\u0142 Nowacki<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , \u201cThe goal was to shift responsibility away from Russia, to undermine trust in the Polish state and its relations with Ukraine.\u201d He emphasizes that Poland is just one testing ground in a broader cognitive campaign being waged against NATO and the EU\u2019s eastern flank.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Czech Republic:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> The real fact that Interior Minister Vit Rakushan received a Romanian state award turned into a conspiracy theory that it was a &#8220;reward&#8221; for canceling elections in the Czech Republic.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Exploiting fear and crises<\/span><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Moldova:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Absurd rumors were circulating against President Maia Sandu (for example, about \u201ctrading children\u201d or \u201cbanning rose tea\u201d). The goal was not to convince everyone, but to create information chaos.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Bulgaria:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> During the 2024 forest fires, a narrative was spread: \u201cBulgaria is burning while NATO is sleeping,\u201d using a real natural disaster as a means of anti-alignment propaganda.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Fear as a weapon:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Yaroslav Slizhevsky<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> calls fear the real \u201cqueen\u201d of disinformation. According to him, disinformation is always intentionally emotional, and deceiving people is quite easy, while convincing them that they have been deceived is a real art.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ol start=\"5\">\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Artificial public opinion and algorithms<\/span><\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Romania:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Expert <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Rezvan Petri<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> says TikTok algorithms were used to boost the campaign of presidential candidate C\u0103lin Georgescu, in coordination with Telegram channels and hundreds of micro-influencers. Petri notes: \u201cOnline radicalization occurs when the environment is ready: inequality, corruption, and discontent make people more likely to accept radical theses.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Czech Republic:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> \u201cAutomated disinformation\u201d was used in the 2025 elections: artificial intelligence wrote thousands of unique comments on news websites, creating the illusion of \u201cmass support\u201d for extremist views.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Journalists&#8217; challenges and countermeasures<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span dir=\"auto\">Experts <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Yaroslav Slizhevsky<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Pavel Nowatsky<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> , and <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Rezvan Petri<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> urge the media not to succumb to algorithmic pressure: \u201cDon\u2019t try to be the first, try to be the most accurate.\u201d To counter disinformation, the experts suggest:<\/span><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Pre-banking (Prevention):<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> Explain manipulation techniques in advance with short (about 90 seconds) videos, which increases the ability to recognize fraud by 1.5\u20132 times.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Debunking and the \u201cTruth Sandwich\u201d:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> According to the method proposed by Slijevsky, a refutation should be constructed as follows: <\/span><strong><span dir=\"auto\">first present the fact, then explain the mechanism of the lie (without repeating the lie in the headline or lead), and finally emphasize the truth again<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> .<\/span><\/li>\n<li><strong><span dir=\"auto\">&#8220;The Socratic Method&#8221;:<\/span><\/strong><span dir=\"auto\"> When rational arguments fail, resort to self-analysis by asking the reader: &#8220;What convinced you to believe this information?&#8221; or &#8220;What source might have made you change your mind?&#8221;<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><span dir=\"auto\">European experience shows that election security depends not only on state institutions, but also on society&#8217;s ability to critically perceive information and journalistic principles.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong><span dir=\"auto\">Marine Kharatyan<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><em><span dir=\"auto\">The material was prepared within the framework of the Disinformation Flows Monitoring Project<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<div class=\"wp-caption alignnone\"><a class=\"fusion-no-lightbox\" href=\"https:\/\/www.auswaertiges-amt.de\/\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\" lazyloaded\" src=\"https:\/\/ishrarmenia.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/logo_opr_amt.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"242\" height=\"150\" data-orig-src=\"https:\/\/ishrarmenia.am\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/logo_opr_amt.png\" \/><\/a><\/div>\n<p><span dir=\"auto\">#CivilSocietyCooperation #ishrarmenia #ishrfactcheck<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong data-start=\"5592\" data-end=\"5708\"><span dir=\"auto\">The project is implemented with the financial support of the Federal Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany.<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>From deepfakes to fear-mongering: What types of disinformation are European countries facing during elections? Electoral processes in Europe are increasingly turning not only into political competition, but also into large-scale information warfare. Social media algorithms, \u201cdormant\u201d user accounts, artificial intelligence, and the fears accumulated in society allow even a single real incident to turn into a political crisis. During a seminar held in Yerevan, experts from the Polish organization &#8220;praktycy.eu&#8221;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":113,"featured_media":77629,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"slim_seo":{"title":"From deepfakes to fear-mongering: What types of disinformation are European countries facing during elections? - Menschenrechte Osteuropa - News &amp; Konflikte","description":"From deepfakes to fear-mongering: What types of disinformation are European countries facing during elections? Electoral processes in Europe are increasingly tu"},"_slim_seo_primary_term_category":220,"_slim_seo_primary_term_post_tag":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[220,218,471,1376],"tags":[823,1381],"class_list":["post-77628","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-armenia","category-bl-en","category-country-armenia-en-2","category-opr-armenia-2026","tag-civilsocietycooperation","tag-opr-armenia-2026"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77628","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/113"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77628"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77628\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":77637,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77628\/revisions\/77637"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/77629"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77628"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77628"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/humanrights-online.org\/az\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77628"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}